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I. JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to at least Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2a(3)(2).
II. ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Issues
1.

Is this Complaint/Cause of action subject to the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act and the common law exception for equitable
relief? (i.e., Whether Rameyfs Requests for Injunctive Relief and Complaint
is Subject to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.)
2.

Did the trial court err by denying Rameyfs requested Temporary

Restraining Order, as Ramey was a bona fide purchaser and was
experiencing harm? (i.e., Whether the trial court properly denied RameyTs
injunctive relief.)
3.

Did the trial court err by not addressing Rameyfs pending

requests for injunctive relief? (i.e., Whether the Trial court Committed Error in not
Addressing Ramey's pending Requests for Injunctive Relief.)

4.

Did the trial court err in denying Ramey's Request for Relief

Under Rule 59 and 60? (i.e., Whether the Trial court Improperly Denied
Ramey's Request for Relief Under Rule 59 and 60.)
1

5.

Did the trial court err in granting Appellant Salt Lake City

Corporation's Motion to Dismiss? {i.e., Whether the Trial court Improperly
Granted Appellants Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion to Dismiss.)

Ill

STANDARDS

OF

REVIEW

AND

CONTROLLING

AUTHORITY
The issue of whether this Complaint/Cause of action is subject to the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the common law exception for
injunctive relief is a question law. Specifically, it is a question of common
law interpretation which the appellate court is well suited to address, and
gives no deference to the lower court. See Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777,
778-79 (Utah 1992); State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (ff[W]e consider the trial court's interpretation of binding case law as
presenting a question of law and review the trial court's interpretation of that
law for correctness.").
Upon information and belief, a trial court's interpretation of statutes,
rules and ordinances is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See, e.g.,
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Tavlor ex
rel C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999); Loporto v.
Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial
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code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d
518, 521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (contractor licensing).
The issue of whether the trial court erred by denying Ramey's
requested Temporary Restraining Order is, upon information and belief,
abuse of discretion. See Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411,
412 (Utah 1998); Miller v. Martineau & Co., 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36
(Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Whether the Trial court Committed Error in not Addressing Ramey's
pending Requests for Injunctive Relief is, upon information and belief,
reviewed under correctness of law. See S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 440-41
(Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999).

This standard of review has also been referred to as a

"correction of error standard." Jacobsen Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839
P.2d 789, 790 (Utah 1992); Sanders v. Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah
1992); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993). As used by Utah's appellate courts, "correctness" means that no
particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law.
See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); State v. Pena, 869
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P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Racklev v. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 970 P.2d
277, 280 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
The issue of whether the Trial court erred in denying Ramey's Request
for Relief Under Rule 59 and 60 is, upon information and belief, reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Supporting authority includes: See Child v.
Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah 1998); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938
(Utah 1994) ("At the extreme end of the discretion spectrum would be a
decision by the trial court to grant or deny a new trial based on insufficiency
of the evidence."); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah
1993); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d
518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). See Butters v. Jackson, 917 P.2d 87, 88
(Utah Ct. App. 1996).

However, as the refusal to grant a new trial was also from an
application of the law, upon information and belief, the appropriate standard
is a correctness standard. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938
(Utah 1993); see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993);
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).
The issue of whether the Trial court Improperly Granted Appellant
Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion to Dismiss is, upon information and
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belief, is correction of error. See Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah
1990).
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Proceedings Below
This appeal is taken from the Trial court's error in denying William P.

Ramey Ill's ("Ramey") Temporary Restraining Order and the error in
dismissing Ramey's remaining requests for injunctive relief/equitable relief
and remaining causes of action.
1.

The Three Main Points of the Case Below

The three main contentions that led Ramey to file the underlying
action from which this Appeal is taken are: (Exhibit F to Docketing
Statement, Affidavit of TRO, 13)
i.

Ramey was and is a bona fide purchaser for value for certain

real property located at 38 South 1000 East, salt Lake City, UT 84102
(hereinafter referred to as the ?,SLC property")).
ii.

Ramey acted in reliance on Salt Lake City Corporation's

(hereinafter referred to as "the SLC Corp") approved Final Inspection
Permits for certain repairs and construction performed on the SLC Property
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and the absence of recorded non-compliance issues at the Recorder of
Deeds.
iii.

Ramey acted in reliance on the Special Exception issued by the

SLC Corp in the summer of 2006 approving the previously inspected and
approved repairs and construction.
B.

Background
1.

Purchase of the SLC Property

On or about August 10, 2005 Plaintiff Ramey purchased certain real
property at 38 South 1000 East, Salt Lake City, UT 84102 (hereinafter
referred to as "SLC Property") for $575,000.00 dollars. There were no
Certificates of Non-compliance recorded against the property.

(See

Affidavit of William P. Ramey, III accompanying the Request for a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, ^j 4.)(hereinafter
referred to as Affidavit)
The SLC Property had undergone several years of restoration
including all electrical, plumbing and support structures. As such, there was
a tremendous amount of contractor work service performed at the SLC
Property. (Affidavit, ^ 5)
Many of these contract work services performed at the SLC Property
required special permitting and inspection procedures by the Appellee SLC
6

Corp that results in an ultimate Final Inspection report whereby the SLC
Corp approves the contractor work services. (Affidavit, ^j 6) Appellee SLC
Corp performed several Mechanical inspections as to the placement of this
A/C Unit that ultimately resulted in Permit No. 199163, Final Inspection,
dated March 4, 2005, approved by, upon information and belief, Buck, #24.
A true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit A of the Affidavit.
(See Affidavit, ^f 8 and Exhibit A) This final approval was the approval by
the SLC Corp of the placement of the A/C Unit. (Affidavit, ^ 8, Exhibit A)

2.
Granted permits were relied upon in the purchase of the
SLC Property
Ramey purchased the SLC Property in reliance upon the various
permits issued by the SLC Corp, especially the Final Approval of permit
199163. (Affidavit, ^f 9)
In or about April of 2006, Ramey became aware that the SLC Corp
had filed a Certificate of Non-compliance against the SLC Property. The
alleged Non-compliance was the placement of the A/C Unit within four (4)
feet of the property line. Ramey contacted the SLC Corp's Planning and
Zoning division and was ultimately directed to Kevin LoPiccolo, Zoning
Administrator (hereinafter referred to as "LoPiccolo"). LoPiccolo informed
Ramey that the Final Approval had been granted improperly.
7

Ramey

informed LoPiccolo that he had purchased the property in reliance upon the
permits issued by his office of the SLC Corp. Ramey informed LoPiccolo
that he felt he was a bona fide purchaser for value. (Affidavit, f 11) Ramey
and LoPiccolo spoke several more times over the next few weeks. In fact,
Ramey supplied the SLC Corp with copies of various final approvals that
had been lost by the SLC Corp. (Affidavit, ^f 12) On information and belief,
the approvals were never lost by the SLC Corp, but thrown out.
3.
Ramey filed and was granted a Special Exception by the
SLC Corp.
LoPiccolo informed Ramey that the only option for Ramey to keep
the A/C Unit in its location was to file a Special Exception Request.
(Affidavit, | 13). The Special Exception allows the SLC Corp and/or the
Community to approve a building project. Ramey protested being required
to seek approval for that which was already approved. The SLC Corp has a
procedure in place for inspecting and approving building projects that was
followed. Ramey purchased the property in reliance on that procedure and
the SLC Corp should not be allowed to change its mind at a later date. To
allow the SLC Corp to make such changes removes all certainty in the
approval and inspection process. (Affidavit, ^f 14)
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However, Ramey did prepare the Special Exception request in an
attempt to comply with the SLC Corp. The Special Exception Request is a
long process whereby an Applicant provides a planned improvement, wit all
of the specification drawings, the $200 fee, the cost for the mailing, and the
address labels.

Putting the documents together required about 20 hours

worth of work and $204. A true and correct copy of Ramey's Special
Exception Request is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit. The Special
Exception Request was a complete document and accepted by the SLC Corp
for review. (Affidavit, ^ 16)
Ramey contacted LoPiccolo on numerous occasions concerning the
Special Exception Request. (Affidavit, ^f 17) On or about June 19, 2006, the
SLC Corp granted the Special Exception request. (Affidavit, If 18) Ramey
was told by Piccolo that the granting of the Special Exception Request was
at least in part because the A/C Unit was a pre-existing condition at the time
Ramey purchased the property and because of other adjacent properties to
the SLC Property likewise had A/C Units placed in comparable proximity to
the property line, namely the property at 42 South 1000 East.

Shortly

thereafter, the Special Exception was recorded at the County Recorder's
Office. (Affidavit, If 19)

9

4.
Ramey moved to Texas and the SLC Corp filed another
Notice of Noncompliance
Ramey then moved to Houston, Texas in August of 2006. However,
Ramey still owned the SLC Property and had put it on the market.
(Affidavit, K 20) On or about November 16, 2006, LoPiccolo contacted
Ramey's agent and stated that the placement of the A/C Unit was not in
compliance. In response, Ramey immediately contacted LoPiccolo, as they
had talked before. LoPiccolo informed Ramey that the SLC Corp was going
to issue another Notice of noncompliance against the SLC Property for the
placement of the A/C Unit. Ramey questioned LoPiccolo as to how that was
possible in light of the two previous approvals and the fact that Ramey was a
bona fide purchaser of the pre-exiting condition. LoPiccolo informed him
that the SLC Corp was requiring the action and there was nothing he could
do. (Affidavit, Tj 21) Ramey's agent questioned whether the SLC property
could be sold as it is presently permitted.

(Affidavit, 1J22).. Further,

LoPiccolo informed Ramey that the SLC Corp has told Ramey's neighbor
that the SLC Property is not legally in compliance. (Affidavit, ^}23)
5.
Ramey Filed a Request for a TRO and accompanying
Complaint
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Thereafter, in December of 2006, Ramey filed a Request for a
Temporary Restraining Order (hereinafter referred to as "TRO") and
Request for a Preliminary Injunction.
In a Complaint filed concurrently (hereinafter referred to as
"Complaint"), Ramey further complained that the SLC Corp's action,
by and through Kevin LoPiccolo and others acted to dissuade
purchasers, acted to cause potential purchasers to look elsewhere, and
acted to prevent Ramey from selling the property at market value.
(See Complaint, fs 1 -46).
Further, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp has a duty to the
property owners of Salt Lake City to honor its previously issued permits and
Special Exceptions. At a minimum, it would be expected that the SLC Corp
would honor its issued permits as to a bona fide purchaser or a purchaser of
a pre-existing condition. (See Complaint, ^fs 1-63).
Further, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp has a duty to the
property owners of Salt Lake City to not falsely make accusations. At a
minimum, it would be expected that the SLC Corp would not contact people
to falsely state that the SLC Property is not legally in compliance. The SLC
Corp has contacted Ramey's agent and stated that the SLC Property was not
legally in compliance. The SLC Corp has contacted Ramey's neighbor and
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stated that the SLC Property is not legally in compliance. Ramey has been
damaged by these false statements by the SLC Corp at least to the appraised
value of the property without the Certificate of Non-compliance. All of the
permits and a Special Exception have been issued by the SLC Corp. (See
Complaint, Tfs 1-86).
Further, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp has a duty to treat all
subject properties in a particular zoning area the same. The standard of care
would be that the rules should be enforced the same throughout a particular
zoning area. The SLC property is in zone R-2. The SLC Corp has not
treated all property owners within Ramey's zone the same or similar.
Ramey's neighbor, at 42 South 1000 East, has a similar A/C Unit that should
be treated like Ramey's A/C Unit. (See Complaint, f s 1-91).
Further, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp's action issuing a
Certificate of Non-compliance and/or issuing a Certificate of Noncompliance for the previously approved Final Inspection of Permit 199163
and the approved Special Exception for the A/C Unit is being perpetuated
falsely without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for value
and the A/C Unit has been approved twice. The SLC Corp is bullying
Ramey by preventing him from transferring title of the SLC Property.
Ramey will continue to be harmed by this false perpetuation and Appellee
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SLC Corp's wrongful conduct at least to the appraised value of the property
without the Certificate of Non-compliance. (See Complaint, ^fs 1-91).
Further, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp's action of recording a
Certificate of Non-compliance for the previously approved Final Inspection
of Permit 199163 and the approved Special Exception for the A/C Unit is
being perpetuated falsely without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide
purchaser for value and the A/C Unit has been approved twice.

(See

Complaint, fs 1-91).
Likewise, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp's action of recording
a Certificate of Non-compliance for the previously approved Final
Inspection of Permit 199163 was perpetuated falsely without any legal basis.
Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for value and the A/C Unit was approved.
Ramey was harmed by this false perpetuation and Appellee SLC Corp's
wrongful conduct. As the direct and proximate result of Appellee SLC
Corp's wrongful conduct, Appellee has unlawfully profited and Ramey has
suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm. (See Complaint, ^|s 191).
Further, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp's action of recording a
Certificate of Non-compliance for the previously approved Final Inspection
of Permit 199163 was perpetuated falsely without any legal basis. Ramey is
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a bona fide purchaser for value and the A/C Unit was approved. The SLC
Corp is bullying Ramey by preventing him from transferring title of the SLC
Property. (See Complaint, Ifs 1-91).
Further, Ramey complained that Ramey is being treated differently
than even his neighbor who has a similar A/C Unit. Upon information and
belief, Ramey's neighbor, at 42 South 1000 East, has not been harassed or
even contacted concerning the A/C Unit on that property. (See Complaint,
Ifs 1-91).
Further, Ramey complained that the Appellee SLC Corp, by and
through LoPiccolo, made a false statement to Ramey's neighbor and real
estate agent that the property was out of compliance. The SLC Corp knew
that all of the permits had been approved and that a Special Exception had
been granted. The SLC Corp's actions damaged Ramey by destroying the
alienability of the SLC Property. (See Complaint, ^fs 1-91).
Further, Ramey complained that the Appellee SLC Corp, by and
through LoPiccolo and, upon information and belief, other SLC Corp
employees, has spread the word that the SLC property is not in compliance,
a false statement. The SLC Corp knew that all of the permits had been
approved and that a Special Exception had been granted. The SLC Corp's
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actions damaged Ramey by destroying the alienability of the SLC Property.
(See Complaint, 1fs 1-91).
6.

The TRO was denied

The TRO was denied on or about December 15, 2005. As a result:
(1) Ramey suffered irreparable harm because the order or injunction
did not issue and Ramey was not able to sell the property because of the
Recorded Notice of Non-compliance;
(2) The injury to Ramey outweighed any alleged damage that the SLC
Corp might have experienced, as the damage is quantifiable;
(3) The injunction would have served the public interest in that it
would have at least restored certainty to the process; and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that Ramey would have and will
prevail on the merits of the underlying claim because Ramey has a validly
issued permit and a granted Special Exception.
In fact, the SLC Corp admitted such in the Motion Hearing Transcript
from March 12, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as "Hearing Transcript" 1),
transcribed and reported back to the Third Trial court on or about August 15,

l A copy of this hearing transcript was not received by Appellant until late
August 2007. Appellant has concurrently filed a supplemental docketing
statement with this Appeal Brief adding the transcript of the March 12, 2007
Motion Hearing to the record on appeal.
15

2007 and attached in the Appendix of this Appellate Brief. On page 6, line
19, Ms Furse, representing the SLC Corp, stated that
For instance, if he were to appeal to the Third District and get a
decision that Salt Lake City erred, then he can do one of two
things. Either he can e content, get his decision and not have a
problem or he can claim, "Okay, because of the error that was
made, as recognized by the Third Trial court, now Tm entitled
to damages.
(Exhibit A to the Appendix, lines 19-24). Accordingly, the SLC Corp
admitted that if it is shown that the SLC Corp erred in the handling of the
SLC Property then Ramey was damaged.
After denying Ramey's TRO, the Trial court allowed the SLC Corp an
extension of time to answer, effectively staying the action. The SLC Corp's
new answer date was extended to about January 12, 2007. (See Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief Under Rule 59 and 60 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("Motion Under Rule 59 or 60"), 1}17).
On or about January 17, 2007, Ramey did file a Notice and Request
for Decision on Plaintiffs Motion for Injunctive relief on or about January
12, 2007. This Court never ruled on Plaintiffs injunctive relief.
Clerk's Docket, p. 2).
7.

The SLC Corp filed a Motion to Dismiss
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(See

Rather than answer, the SLC Corp filed a Motion to Dismiss. The
SLC Corp's Motion to Dismiss was at least in part predicated upon Ramey'
s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies and Ramey' s alleged
failure to give sixty days Notice to the SLC Corp prior to filing suit. (See
Motion Under Rule 59 or 60, ^18).
Ramey did file a Notice and Request for Decision on Plaintiffs
Motion for Injunctive relief on or about January 12, 2007. The Trial court
never ruled on Plaintiffs injunctive relief. (See Motion Under Rule 59 or
60, ^fl9). This period of time was while the Court ordered stay was in effect.
Ultimately, after briefing and a Motion Hearing, on or about March
12, 2007, the Trial court granted the SLC Corp's motion to dismiss in a
Minute Entry issued March 14, 2007. (See Minute Entry of March 14,
2007).
At the Motion Hearing, the SLC Corp argued that Ramey's Complaint
is about seeking damages from the SLC Corp. (See Appendix, Hearing
Transcript, p. 4, 1. 9 to p. 7, 1. 8). Ramey's Complaint and request for
injunctive relief has always been about the fact that
1.

Ramey was a Bona Fide Purchaser for Value;

2.

Ramey Acted in Reliance on SLC Corp Permits in
Purchasing the SLC Property; and,

17

3.

Ramey asserts that he is a bona fide purchaser for value
relying on the permits issued by the City in the purchase
of the SLC Property. (See Motion Under Rule 59 or 60,
1js6-2l).

Ramey sought the injunctive relief to stop the SLC Corp from its abuse of
the process and return certainty to that process. The SLC Corp cannot recast
Ramey's cause of action.
At the Motion Hearing, Ramey handed the Court copies of controlling
case law from the Utah Supreme Court, Jenkins v. Swan 675 P.2d 1145,
1153 (Utah 1983) (included in the Addendum, item #2), which explains the
common law exception to governmental immunity for equitable claims.
(See Appendix, Hearing Transcript, p. 11,1. 21 to p. 12,1. 19).
All permits indicated that the SLC property at 38 South 1000 East,
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 was in compliance. All inspections were Final.
No Notices of Non-compliance were recorded against the SLC property at
the time of Ramey's closing on the SLC Property. (See Motion Under Rule
59 or 60, Tfs 6-21).
Ramey's mortgage company searched the records at the time of
closing and also did not locate any Notice of Non-compliance. The SLC
Corp filed a first Notice of Non-compliance after Ramey had purchased and
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recorded his interest in the property. Ramey's purchase was partial cash and
a mortgage. The A/C Unit was therefore a pre-existing condition. Ramey
purchased the SLC Property in reliance on the SLC Corp's Final Inspection
permits. Ramey would not have purchased the property had the permits not
been issued as Final and Approved. The SLC Corp should not be allowed to
remove validly issued Final Inspection Permits after Ramey has relied on
them in the purchase of the property. (See Motion Under Rule 59 or 60, ^js
6-21).
After becoming aware of a Non-compliance recorded against the SLC
property, Ramey sought to have it removed by going the extraordinary
expense of both time and resources to prepare a Special Exception request
for a previously granted Final Inspection Permit. The SLC Corp's Planning
and Zoning Division agreed with Ramey that the A/C Unit was a preexisting condition on the SLC Property at the time of Ramey's purchase and
granted the Special Exception. When Ramey put his property on the market,
the SLC Corp threatened to prevent Ramey from selling the property by
recording a Notice of Non-compliance against the property. The SLC Corp
should not be allowed to alter recorded records as it desires after a valid
Special Exception has issued from its office.

Returning to this

memorandum, this Court denied Ramey's request for a temporary
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restraining order and allowed the SLC Corp an extension of time to answer,
effectively staying the action.

The SLC Corp's new answer date was

extended to about January 12, 2007. (See Motion Under Rule 59 or 60, f s 621).
Ultimately, the trial court granted the SLC Corp's motion to dismiss
in an Order issued March 14, 2007. (See Memorandum Decision of March
14, 2007). The Court appears to have held that "[wjhile Plaintiff contends
he is not taking issue with the decision of the Zoning Administrator and only
seeks equitable relief, he is, nonetheless, challenging the land use decision
embodied in the Certificate of Noncompliance. As a result, Plaintiff must
exhaust his administrative remedies. With respect to the Notice of Claim
issue, the statute makes clear that the sixty days must be exhausted prior to
the action being initiated." See (See Memorandum Decision of March 14,
2007, p. 3). Ramey received the order on March 19, 2007 through regular
US mail. The trial court never addressed Ramey's equitable relief.
The trial court appears to have held that "Plaintiff contends he is not
taking issue with the decision of the Zoning Administrator and only seeks
equitable relief, he is, nonetheless, challenging the land use decision
embodied in the Certificate of Noncompliance. As a result, Plaintiff must
exhaust his administrative remedies. With respect to the Notice of Claim
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issue, the statute makes clear that the sixty days must be exhausted prior to
the action being initiated." (See Minute Entry of May 9, 2007). The Trial
court never addressed the pending injunctive relief.
8.

Ramey files a Motion for relief under Rule 59 or 60

Ramey then filed a Motion for relief under rule 59 and 60 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to reinstate Ramey' s dismissed action as required
by long established Utah Supreme Court precedent, the Governmental
Immunity Act does not apply to claims for equitable relief. The Motion was
timely filed and the trial court did consider it. However, the trial court
denied Ramey's requested relief.
9.

The Court issued a Final Order on May 15, 2007

The Trial court entered a Final Order on or about May 15, 2007
finally dismissing Rameyfs Causes of Action. Ramey never received a copy
of this Order. In fact, Salt City Attorney Margaret Plane has also indicated
that she has not received a copy. Ramey timely appealed from the trial
court's order.
V. ARGUMENT
A.
The underlying cause of action is subject to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act and the common law exception for
equitable relief

21

Reference to the first document filed in this case illustrates that this is
an equitable action. The title of the Complaint is "Original Complaint and
Request for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction."
(See Complaint, title page). File concurrently with the requested equitable
relief was a complaint complaining of various injuries and requesting
damages, as is standard practice.

Accordingly, equitable relief was

requested and equitable relief is not subject to the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

This Court gives no deference to the lower court on a

misinterpretation of the common law. See Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777,
778-79 (Utah 1992); State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (n[W]e consider the trial court's interpretation of binding case law as
presenting a question of law and review the trial court's interpretation of that
law for correctness.").
The SLC Corp has misled the trial court into thinking that the
underlying action is an action for damages and an action complaining of a
certificate of non-compliance.

As Ramey was the underlying plaintiff,

Ramey is the master of his own Complaint. As the Background of this
Appeal stated, Ramey was seeking relief from the SLC Corp not following
its own policies and procedures. (See Complaint, fs 6-16).
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Ramey purchased a house with all permits approved. The SLC Corp
later changed its mind, thereby affecting Ramey as a bona fide purchaser,
and issued a Notice of Noncompliance. Ramey then filed for the Special
Exception.

That Special Exception was granted and recorded on the

property.
Then, only after Ramey moved to Texas, the SLC Corp issued and
recorded another Notice of Noncompliance in November of 2006. The SLC
Corp, without any authority and against public policy and its published
procedures, issued another Certificate of Noncompliance for the exact issue
that was approved through the Special Exception procedure. Accordingly,
the SLC Corp has completely ignored its policies and procedures. It was the
SLC Corp that originally permitted the A/C Unit. It then changed its mind
after Ramey purchased the property. It was the SLC Corp that granted
Ramey's Special Exception. It then changed its mind after Ramey moved to
Texas and issued another Notice of Noncompliance. Accordingly, the SLC
Corp has operated completely outside its statutory framework and its
policies and procedures. Nowhere is authorization provided for what the
SLC Corp did.

The SLC Corp's actions damage the public. By its actions, the SLC
Corp has removed all certainty from the process. If this Court allows its
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Order to stand dismissing this action, the SLC Corp will be authorized to
change its mind on any Special Exception that it has granted previously.
There will no longer be any certainty in the process. This issue is larger than
this one case. Here, the SLC Corp is being given implicit authorization to
do as it wishes by this Court in dismissing this cause of action. Ramey's
complaint is not about the Notice of Noncompliance. Ramey's complaint is
about the broken policies and procedures at the SLC Corp. In fact, Ramey's
complaint and the relief sought, injunctive relief, makes this very apparent.
It is time to return certainty to the process. It is time to prevent the SLC
Corp from changing the rules as it goes. Here, Ramey followed all policies
and procedures. Here, the SLC Corp did not.
The trial court was provided with the appropriate law at the Motion
Hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and in the briefing on the Motion for
Relief under Rule 59 and 60. However, the trial court misinterpreted the
common law.

This Court gives no deference to the lower court on a

misinterpretation of the common law. See Trujillo, 840 P.2d at 778-79;
State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d at 518 (f,[W]e consider the trial court's
interpretation of binding case law as presenting a question of law and review
the trial court's interpretation of that law for correctness.").
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The trial court, at least in part, dismissed Ramey's causes of action on
its misinterpretation that Ramey failed to give proper Notice of Claim to the
SLC Corp and that Ramey failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Ramey requests this Court to affirmatively state that Ramey has complied
with the Notice requirement and that Ramey's is complaining of the broken
policies and procedures of the SLC Corp.
A trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a
question of law reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake
County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson,
977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999); Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep.
21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing
& Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
(contractor licensing). Here, the trial court/trial court was incorrect in its
interpretation of the law and the underlying action should not have been
dismissed as equitable relief was sought. Moreover, equitable relief was still
pending and never considered by the trial court.
Further, it has long been the law that the sixty (60) days Notice
requirement of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to
requests for injunctive relief. See Jenkins 675 P.2d at 1153 citing El Rancho
Enterprises 565 P.2d at 779. In the Jenkins case, the Utah Supreme Court
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provided a good discussion on the rationale for the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, Section 63-30-11. That portion of the act provides that "any
person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity or against an
employee shall before maintaining an action for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, shall file a written notice of claim with such entity."
See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1153-1154. The Court then went on to discuss the
meaning of the word "injury" within the Act. See Id at 1154. Injury is
defined, in the Governmental Immunity Act as "death, injury to a person,
damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to
his person, or estate that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person
or his agent."

See id. In the Jenkins case, the Utah Supreme Court

recognized that actions seeking equitable relief are not subject to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

See Id and El Rancho, 565 P.2d at 780.

Accordingly, Ramey's Complaint is not subject to the Notice requirement.
Therefore, there is no requirement to wait sixty (60) days after a Notice of
Claim.
However, even if this Court determines a Notice is due, a Notice was
filed by Ramey.

Further, the SLC Corp and Ramey were in constant
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communication throughout 2006 as is illustrated by the Special Exception
and Notices of Non-compliance. The SLC Corp did have Notice.
Moreover, careful examination of the Jenkins case reveals that the
Utah Supreme Court also allowed Jenkins' claims for damages of the tax
paid in protest. See id at 779. Accordingly, Ramey's requests for damages
should be allowed to continue as they were filed with the requests for
injunctive relief.

Therefore, Ramey requests this Court to Order

reinstatement of Ramey's Complaint particularly specifying that proper
Notice was given.
Logically, the reinstatement of the damages with the equitable claims
is appropriate.

This well-established common law exception to the

Governmental Immunity Act does not require the maintenance of two
separate actions, as would be the effect if this Court did not reinstate the
claims for damages and Ramey was required to file a separate action.
B.
The trial court erred by denying Rameyfs requested Temporary
Restraining Order, as Ramey was a bona fide purchaser and was
experiencing harm
This Court will review the trial court's denial of Ramey's requested
TRO for an abuse of discretion. See Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972
P.2d 411, 412 (Utah 1998); Miller v. Martineau & Co., 372 Utah Adv. Rep.
34, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Under Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
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Procedure, a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction
may issue where the applicant demonstrates the following:
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or
injunction issues;
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage
the proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or
enjoined;

(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the
public interest; and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on
the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues
on the merits which should be the subject of further litigation. Utah
R. of Civ. P. 65A(e).
1.
Ramey Did Suffer Irreparable Harm when the TRO did not
issue
The SLC Corp's acts of approving the construction through permit
199163, then issuing a Notice of Noncompliance, then granting a Special
Exception, then issuing another Notice of Noncompliance prevented Ramey
from transferring title the SLC property, dissuaded buyers and lowered the
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value of Ramey's property. Further, the SLC Corp damaged Ramey through
at least tortious interference with contract and prospective contract,
negligent misrepresentation, negligence, fraud, wrongful

recordation,

wrongful attachment, conversion, trespass to try title, trespass to real
property, slander of title, and the like.
As set forth in the record, the SLC Corp, by and through the Planning
and Zoning Division, had granted approval of the placement of the A/C Unit
through the normal permitting procedure under permit 199163, granted
March 4, 1995. However, then the SLC Corp issued a Certificate of Noncompliance against the SLC Property for the placement of the A/C Unit.
Ramey had purchased the property before the Certificate of Noncompliance was recorded, as such he is a bona fide purchaser for value and
can rely on the issued permit 199163. However, the SLC Corp proceeded to
file the Certificate of Non-compliance
Ramey purchased the property on August 10, 1995 when there were
no Certificates of Non-compliance recorded against the property. In August
of 2006, Ramey relocated to Texas and placed the SLC Property on the
market through an agency. To place the property on the MLS, Ramey had to
sign an agreement with his agent.
a.

Interference with Contract:
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In November of 2006, when the SLC Corp contacted Ramey's agent it
committed an act of interference with contract in that the SLC Corp was
attempting to cause the agent not to market the property in light of a nonexistent compliance issue.

Such act is interfering with Ramey's

representation agreement with the agent, interfering with his contract. Such
actions are calculated by the SLC Corp to force Ramey to spend great sums
of money for an issue that has been at least twice remedied under the SLC
Corp's procedures. Such damage is a dollar amount at least to the appraised
value of the property without the Certificate of Non-compliance.
Likewise, the SLC Corp's action, by and through LoPiccolo and
others did dissuade purchasers, acted to cause potential purchasers to look
elsewhere, and acted to prevent Ramey from selling the property.
b.

Negligent Misrepresentation:

The SLC Corp represented to Ramey that the A/C Unit was properly
placed and approved. Ramey purchased the SLC Property in light of an
issued permit, permit 199163, a Final Approval. Ramey relied, therefore, on
the permit. Likewise, after the long, expensive, and time-consuming process
of preparing and getting approved the Special Exception Request, Ramey
should be able to rely upon its validity.
granted Special Exception.
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Here, Ramey relied upon the

The SLC Corp has a duty to the property owners of Salt Lake City to
honor its previously issued permits and Special Exceptions. Here, the SLC
Corp did not honored its previously issued permit 199163.
c.

Negligence:

The SLC Corp further has a duty to correctly represent the recorded
records on a piece of property. At a minimum, it would be expected that the
SLC Corp would not contact people to falsely state that the SLC Property is
not legally in compliance. The SLC Corp did contact Ramey's agent and
stated that the SLC Property was not legally in compliance. Further, the
SLC Corp has contacted Ramey's neighbor and stated that the SLC Property
is not legally in compliance even considering that the SLC Corp granted
upon Final Inspection approval permit 199163 and even considering that the
SLC Corp granted the Special Exception.
d.

Wrongful Recordation and Wrongful Attachment

The SLC Corp's action of threatening to record a Certificate of Noncompliance and/or recording a Certificate of Non-compliance for the
previously approved Final Inspection of Permit 199163 and the approved
Special Exception for the A/C Unit is being perpetuated falsely without any
legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for value and the A/C Unit has
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been approved twice. The SLC Corp's action of recording a Certificate of
Non-compliance for the previously approved Final Inspection of Permit
199163 was perpetuated falsely without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona
fide purchaser for value and the A/C Unit was approved.

e.
Conversion/Trespass to Try Title/Trespass to Real
Property:
The SLC Corp's act recording a Certificate of Non-compliance for the
previously approved Final Inspection of Permit 199163 and the approved
Special Exception for the A/C Unit is being perpetuated falsely without any
legal basis.
f.

Suit to Quiet Title/Trespass to Real Property:

The SLC Corp discriminated against Ramey in the sale of his property
by recording an improper Certificate of Non-compliance and for threatening
to file an improper Certificate of Non-compliance. Ramey is being treated
differently than even his next door neighbor who has a similar A/C Unit.
Upon information and belief, Ramey's neighbor, at 42 South 1000 East, has
not been harassed or even contacted concerning the A/C Unit on that
property. Ramey is being damaged by this disparate treatment in that the
SLC Property cannot be sold because of the threats and actions from the
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SLC Corp. Accordingly, the SLC Corp is damaging Ramey at least to the
amount of his mortgage.
g.

Slander of Title:

Defendant SLC Corp, by and through LoPiccolo, made a false
statement to Ramey's neighbor and real estate agent that the property was
out of compliance. The SLC Corp knew that all of the permits had been
approved and that a Special Exception had been granted. The SLC Corp's
actions damaged Ramey by destroying the alienability of Ramey's SLC
property.
Accordingly, Ramey is likely to be successful on all of his causes of
action, as they all stem from the SLC Corp disregarding its previously issued
permit 199163 and its previously granted Special Exception. These harms
could only have been resolved by the issuance of injunctive relief, as merely
awarding damages was not sufficient to remove all the confusion, to allow
certainty to prevail, and to cause SLC Corp to honor its own actions.
2.
The Threatened Harm to Ramey Outweighed Any Damages
That May Result to SLC Corp

Ramey was irreparably harmed The SLC Corp prevented transfer of
title and required Ramey to expend further resources on the SLC property.
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The requested temporary restraining order is not outweighed by the potential
damages to the Defendant, as the SLC Corp is not entitled to continue its
unlawful behavior. Issuance of the temporary restraining order would have
only barred the SLC Corp from falsely recording a Certificate of Noncompliance against the SLC Property for the placement of the A/C Unit.
The SLC Corp, as a governmental organization, will not be in any way
harmed.
3.
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order Would Not Be
Adverse to Public Interest.
Courts have long considered the public interest as a factor to be
considered in granting injunctive relief. Here, the granting of the restraining
order and injunction would have served the public interest in at least (1)
returning certainty to the property records; (2) returning certainty to the
special exception procedure; (3) returning certainty to the inspection
process; (4) preventing Salt Lake City Corporation from continued
harassment of Ramey, a property owner and former resident; (5) establishing
that this type of act by the Salt Lake City Corporation is a prohibited act;
and, (6) restoring alienability to Ramey's land.

Accordingly, there are

strong public policy reasons to grant this restraining order and injunction.
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4.
There Is a Substantial Likelihood That Ramey Will Prevail
on the Merits of its Claim in the Instant Case.
Under the present facts, as outlined above, there is a substantial
likelihood that Ramey will prevail on the merits of his claims. Ramey has
an issued Final Approval for the placement of the A/C Unit on the SLC
Property that he relied on as a purchaser of the property.

Accordingly,

Ramey is a bona fide purchaser. Further, Ramey has a granted Special
Exception for which he expended both economic resources and time. As
well, public policy should dictate that the SLC Corp honor it's granted
permits and granted special exceptions.

Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ramey's
requested TRO.
C.
The trial court erred by not addressing Ramey's pending requests
for injunctive relief.
This Court will give no deference to the trial court in reviewing its
decision to dismiss the action without addressing Ramey's pending
injunctive relief. See S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Utah 1998); Orton
v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing
& Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
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Ramey had pending injunctive relief that was not addressed by the trial
court.
D.
The trial court erred in denying Rameyfs Request for Relief
Under Rule 59 and 60
This Court will review the trial court's denial of Ramey's Request for
Relief Under Rule 59 and 60 under an abuse of discretion standard. See
Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah 1998); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
938 (Utah 1994) ("At the extreme end of the discretion spectrum would be a
decision by the trial court to grant or deny a new trial based on insufficiency
of the evidence."); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah
1993); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d
518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). See Butters v. Jackson, 917 P.2d 87, 88
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). Here, the trial court did abuse its discretion as it was
given the correct law to follow and still dismissed the case and denied the
request for relief under rule 59 and 60.
A correctness standard will be used in the trial court's interpretation
of the common law. Crookston, 860 P.2d at 938; see State v. Thurman, 846
P.2d 1256, 1270 n.l 1 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82
n.3 (Utah 1991).
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E.
The trial court erred in granting Appellant Salt Lake City
Corporation's Motion to Dismiss
The underlying action was an action for equitable relief and the trial
court should not have dismissed the action as equitable relief is not subject
to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1153
citing El Rancho Enterprises, Inc., 565 P.2d at 779; and, Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, Section 63-30-11. This Court will review the decision under
the standard for a correction of error. See Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22
(Utah 1990). Here, it was error to dismiss Ramey's causes of action.
VI.

PRAYER AND CONCLUSION
Ramey respectfully prays that this Court reinstate Ramey's Causes of

Action by Reversing the Trial court's Order Dismissing all of Ramey's
causes of Action. Further, Ramey respectfully requests that this Court order
the Appellant to pay the costs for this appeal, a reasonable attorney's fee for
this appeal, the costs for the Trial court action, and a reasonable attorney's
fee for the Trial court action. Appellant further respectfully requests the
ability to supplement issues for appeal once the Final Order Dismissing the
action is received.
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Respectfully Submitted,

William P. Ramey, III
38 South 1000 East
Salt Lake ( % , Utahjjjjj
2244 Welch St.
Houston, TX 77019
(713) 857-6005 (phone)
(713) 429-4187 (fax)
Pro Se
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM P. RAMEY, III,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 060920071 PR

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MOTION HEARING

March 12, 2007

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI
District Court Judge

|eri Kearbey
Certified Court Transcriber
iz-50 Gaylene Circle
Sandy, Utah 84094
(801) chh-

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:

Pro Se

For the Defendant:

Evelyn J. Furse
Salt Lake City Attorney
451 South State, #505A
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, MARCH 12, 2007, 9:00 A.M.
-oooOoooTHE COURT:

Matter before the Court is Ramey v.

Salt Lake City Corporation, 060920071.

William P. Ramey

appears pro se. Evelyn Furse —
MS. FURSE: Yes.
THE COURT:

— on behalf of respondent. Also,

Mr. Chandler.
MR. CHANDLER:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

Good morning.

Good morning.

This is before the Court on Salt Lake City
Corporation's motion to dismiss.

That has been briefed.

However, on March the 7th, Mr. Ramey filed a notice of the
Board of Adjustment decision conclusively ending Ramey's
administrative remedies.
Ms. Furse, have you had opportunity to review
this?
MS. FURSE:

Yes, I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Do you wish to have an opportunity to

reply to it?

Does it — does it warrant a reply on your

behalf, or can we go forward with the argument, or do you
want opportunity to have a written reply and a response from
Mr. Ramey?
MS. FURSE:

We can go forward today and I can

address it in my oral argument today.
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THE COURT:

Very well.

Thank you.

With that said, the Court appreciates courtesy
copies of the motion, both memorandum in support, opposition
and reply.

This is the time for oral argument on Salt Lake

City's motion.

Ms. Furse, you have convenience of the

record.
MS. FURSE:

Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Good morning.

MS. FURSE:

With respect to the Board of

Adjustment decision which you just mentioned, that is not
before this Court at this time because it is not in the
initial complaint as — that — that's in dispute for the
motion to dismiss here today.
However, it doesn't exactly exhaust the
administrative process as a point of procedure because, as
noted in the — in the notice from the Board, the plaintiff
has 30 days from the time he receives the final written
decision to appeal that decision to the Third District
Court, which is a separate appeal than what's occurring
here.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And, to be honest, you've lost

MS. FURSE:

I figured I might have.

THE COURT:

But, I mean, I guess what I was trying

me there.

to do is to get everybody on the same path so we can move
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this in an orderly manner through the system.
MS. FURSE:

That's correct.

THE COURT:

And maybe my wishes will not come to

fruition, because you indicate that there's two separate
parallel paths of appeal?
MS. FURSE:

Well, it - actually, no.

It's one

parallel — it's one path —
THE COURT:

Path.

MS. FURSE:

- but this path

got started too

early is the problem.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. FURSE:

The path is, you go from having

whatever decision you might receive from the zoning
administrator or from the — from whatever land use decision
you might get, and you appeal that to the Board of
Adjustment.

From the Board of Adjustment, you are entitled

to appeal their decision to the Third District Court.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. FURSE:

But that is only the decision.

You're

not entitled to any damages from that appeal in any fashion.
So you finish that appeal to the Third District Court.
THE COURT:

Now, is that the track we're on now?

MS. FURSE:

No.

THE COURT:

Okay.

That's not the track we're on

now.
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MS. FURSE:

That's the track that this Board of

Adjustment decision is part of. And that's why I say it's
not really pertinent to this matter.
THE COURT:

But the track that we're on now, your

argument is, that he — it is premature again and he has
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
MS. FURSE:

Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. FURSE:

And the track Mr. Ramey's pursuing now

is the track wherein he can get damages.

And in order to

start on the damage track, you have to exhaust the basic
track of getting your final decision.

And there's — and

that track — he's farther along now than he was previously
because he's gone to the Board of Adjustment.

But he now

needs to go from the Board of Adjustment to the Third
District Court, which could be you, but it has to — and get
that decision and then, depending on that decision, he may
or may not be able to come back for damages.
For instance, if he were to appeal to the Third
District and get a decision that Salt Lake City erred, then
he can do one of two things.

Either he can be content, get

his decision and not have a problem or he can claim, "Okay,
because of the error that was made, as recognized by the
Third District Court, now I'm entitled to damages."
THE COURT:

Okay.
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MS. FURSE:

But none of that can be done until

this final step of the appeal from the Board of Adjustment
to the Third District Court is complete.
THE COURT:

So regardless of the path that we're

taking, your argument in today's hearing is:

In spite of

the Board of Adjustment decision, in spite of the procedural
history of my case, it is still premature in that he still
has to exhaust remedies.
MS. FURSE:

That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

So the remedy you're asking for me to

decide is to dismiss without prejudice —
MS. FURSE: Correct.
THE COURT:

- allow him to go — not recreate, but

to go back to the original process, pick up loose ends,
follow through on that and then ultimately appeal again to
the District Court.
MS. FURSE:

That's exactly right, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

You anticipate his argument regarding

the Board of Adjustment decision and as to his — as to his
ending his administrative remedies?
argument on that?

Do you anticipate his

And if you do, tell me what your response

is.
MS. FURSE:

Well, my — what I would anticipate is

basically an argument that this does terminate the appeal
and that the two — that the appeal from the Third District

from the Board of Adjustment decision can be consolidated
with this decision without there being any harm.
THE COURT: Right.
MS. FURSE:

Now, my argument to that is it's not

about harm, it's about jurisdiction.

And when we're looking

at jurisdiction, we don't look at harm, we look simply at
what does the Court have the authority to do?

And in this

circumstance, the only authority the Court has is to dismiss
this case at this point.
THE COURT:

And I guess that was what I was

looking at to save him the extra time, expense, hassle of
jumping through hoops.

But if it's a jurisdictional issue,

I have no discretion on something like that.
MS. FURSE:

That's exactly right, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Because as you — as you argue to me

now, I do not have jurisdiction now by allowing him and to
recognize the — the Adjustment decision would still be doing
something that I have no jurisdiction over.
MS. FURSE:

That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Anything else?

MS. FURSE:

That's the - and it's a similar

problem with the notice of claim, which was also filed in
the interim.
THE COURT: Right.
MS. FURSE:

Is it's a jurisdictional matter.

And
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states quite clearly, you can't file the

notice of claim at the same time as you file the actual
lawsuit.

There has to be the period given.
THE COURT:

Sixty days.

Isn't there 60 days or

something like that?
MS. FURSE:

That - 60 days is the current

jurisdictional period.

And so — and that is a

jurisdictional issue as well.

So we're — so the Court lacks

jurisdiction both for failure to comply with the notice of
claim procedures and also for the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
THE COURT:

Now, if I — if I buy your argument and

I dismiss without prejudice, are you telling me that
Mr. Ramey will suffer no prejudice by virtue of the fact
that he has started this action, it's been dismissed and he
has to go back.

There's no time limits that he's going to

be facing, no prejudice he's going to be facing in now
readdressing the issues pursuant to your argument?
MS. FURSE:

That's - I mean, he has a time limit,

but he has a — he's not missed it.

There is a 30-day time

limit from the time he gets a written decision on the Board
of Adjustment decision, which he does not — my understanding
is he does not have yet.

This does — the notice that was

sent to you is not the written decision.
THE COURT: Yes.
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that.

MS. FURSE:

That doesn't constitute that.

MR. RAMEY:

Your Honor, if I may.

I have received

I don't have copies of it for everyone —
THE COURT:

Okay.

But you received it and so,

then, it's 30 days from the date of receipt.
MS. FURSE:

Thirty days from the date of receipt.

THE COURT:

But then I'm anticipating that's time

in the future that we can work with.
MS. FURSE: Correct.
MR. RAMEY:
on the 7th.

Your Honor, I believe I received that

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Appreciate that.

So he has until April 6th or — or something like
that.
MS. FURSE:

Somewhere around there to appeal —

THE COURT: Yeah.
MS. FURSE:
decision.

- simply the Board of Adjustment

And then after that, then he files the notice of

claim, which will give — you know, assuming — depending what
that decision is. Then he's got the 60 days from the notice
of claim and then a year from there.
THE COURT:

But to hear your argument and to

reiterate my understanding of it is I lack jurisdiction
because he hasn't done all of the procedural requirements.
But if I grant your motion to dismiss, he is not having any
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prejudice against him and as long as he files within the
time frame of the 30 days from receiving the decision of the
Board of Adjustment.
MS. FURSE:

That!s correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. FURSE:

No.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

MS. FURSE:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Mr. Ramey.

MR. RAMEY:

Yes, sir.

Anything else?

That's our argument.

Your Honor, William Ramey, the plaintiff.
I!d like to start off, if you wouldnft mind my
approaching the Court and handing him a series of documents
that I111 reference one at a time through the argument.
THE COURT:

Have they been included in your

MR. RAMEY:

They are not.

briefing?
But I have two copies

of them for both sides.
THE COURT:

Hand it to Counsel.

Thank you, Mr. Ramey.
MR. RAMEY:

Thank you.

Ifd like to start off, Your Honor, by

saying that, from the start, the Salt Lake City Corp. Is
trying to couch this action as me filing a complaint seeking
damages against the City.
You will remember that Mr. Chambers, me and you,
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we sat in your chambers on December 15th, I believe it was,
and I sought a TRO with equitable relief.

In equity, there

is no jurisdictional limit for me seeking equity.
court has a case right here, what is it, Jenkins

This
v.

Swan,

establishes the age-old principle in Salt Lake — or in Utah,
pardon me, that common law exception to governmental
immunity pertaining to equitable claims has long been
recognized in this law, so the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act does not change that.
So, first off, I want to get it straight that we —
this was not an action for damages; this was an equitable
action when it was filed.

And this Court, when we were

sitting in there, because everyone was on vacation for
Christmas break, we delayed the time Salt Lake City would
respond, and so I filed the Notice of Claim in that time.
Because this was an equitable action when it started, and
when it didn't start the actual damage portion of what I was
complaining of as my injuries, what this case goes into as
being what I was seeking, that was purely equity.
Salt Lake City said, "We're not going to do
anything; equity situation was solved."

You denied the

motion, I filed the Notice of Claim on January 5th, 60 days
has passed by now.

The claim, the Notice of Claim, doesn't

change, it's the same claim.

The only thing that's happened

in the interim is we've gone one step further.

And the

12

Board of Adjustment on their own, not called by me, met and
issued a second non-compliance or a third non-compliance.
But even though we1re there, just to get the facts
of the case straight, I never even complained of the fact
that they didn't give me — they issued a notice of noncompliance,

I complained very simply, if you turn to this

document right here, about the procedure that Salt Lake City
Corp. used.

The procedure was I purchased a house — we'll

go back to ninety - pardon me, '95 — purchased a house on
August 10th.

The title search — we went through the title

search and revealed there were no adverse liens or adverse
notices of non-compliance that were against the property.
Soon thereafter, the Salt Lake City Corp., unknown
to me, files a notice of non-compliance on the property, and
I find out about it in April of '06. Pardon me, Your Honor.
I ha<sl to think about the dates. And in April of '06, I then
contacted Salt Lake City Corp., Kevin LaPickla, who's the
zoning administrator, and asked Kevin, "What do I do about
this?"
And we talked for about two and a half minutes and
we arrived at a decision that I had to file a special
exception request.

I prepared the special exception

request, which takes a lot of hours.
affidavit.

It's in my original

It's a large document with plans and everything

drawn up, a large expense for me. And then I took that and
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I filed it with him.

And, in his discretion, he granted it

and recorded on the property a certificate of compliance
that that air conditioner was placed properly on the
property.
I then get a job offer in Houston that I take.
And I move to Houston in August.

And so then, in November,

on November 21st or — yeah, November 21st, I get a call from
Kevin saying, "We1re going to issue another certificate of
non-compliance."

And so that's when I arranged the plane

tickets to come out to file the TRO.

And we all know how

the story goes from there; Ms. Furse has said it very well.
But what I would like to point out is, if you went
on the website for Title 21, Salt Lake City has on their
website a map — flow chart how the process should work for a
special exception.
portions.

And I've highlighted the relevant

We can simply jump through in how I submitted

everything, and I don't need to follow through with it, but
you can see that the lines go the way the — if the special
exceptions — if it doesn't meet the special exception
standards, meaning that all neighbors have to sign off on
it, it then goes to an administrative hearing where Kevin
LaPickla, being the zoning administrator, has the authority,
the discretion, Your Honor, to approve it, and then it goes
to an issue of permit.
Nowhere in this procedure is there anywhere for
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the Salt Lake City Corp. to come back and issue another
certificate of non-compliance.

So what Ifm — what I was

complaining of in the TRO, was to stop that entire process,
if you remember, that, "Wait, something1s broken here.
Something's not working right.
supposed to follow.

We have policies that we're

We have a — we have guidelines that

they published for us to look at the public that they're
supposed to follow," and they're out of bounds in doing
that."

And that's what I was originally filing on.
Going to the administrative remedies.

This was

never filed as an exhaustion of my administrative remedies,
it was filed to actually say, "Hey, wait, there are no
administrative procedures in this case. We need a court now
to tell Salt Lake City that they have to follow their own
guidelines."
I was a bona fide purchaser of (inaudible) from
the start, through a long talk, I went ahead and did the
special exception and even got that approved.

And now

they've gone back and again changed their mind.
And so we could sit here right today — right here
today, Your Honor, and tomorrow they could issue a
certificate of compliance based on the facts that have
happened today.

And I think we need your input, Your Honor,

yourself to tell them how they should be doing things, that
they need to follow their own procedures.

And that's what I

15

was complaining of.
The 60 days, again, I filed the notice to the City
which was, I believe, filed with your court on the 5th of
January, the notice of the notice on January 5th.
means the 60 days have even passed.

So that

So even if we assumed

that you have to wait 60 days, which, technically, the City
has 60 days, but there's a statutory period that I must wait
that period to file, it's just how long the City has to be
back with me.

But their continued prosecution of this suit

actually tells me what they're doing.

And the original

filing of the TRO should in itself, as an equitable form of
remedy, serve as notice in any case.

Because it was filed

with the city recorder's office when I filed the TRO.
See, it's hard to even — to even say that that
document alone didn't suffice as notice.

It wasn't styled

"Notice to City" would be the only thing that it wasn't.
So, yes, I mean, in every ground, I've covered all the
jurisdictional bases for this court, and I can't see where
the court, under any understanding of the actual facts,
doesn't have jurisdiction, Your Honor.

argument.

THE COURT:

Anything more?

MR. RAMEY:

No.

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Ramey.

That's it, Your Honor.
Appreciate your

Directly to the point.
Ms. Furse, your rebuttal?
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MS. FURSE:

The case submitted to you by - by

Mr. Ramey does not address the issue of the Court's
jurisdiction.

The Court has to have jurisdiction before it

can do anything other than rule — than dismiss a case. And
that doesn't exist in this matter.

And the case on the

issue of failure to — failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is the Haun v. Utah

Public

Safety,

versus

— or Utah Department

of

which is cited to you in our brief, which

cites:
If a plaintiff has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, then we lack subject
matter jurisdiction and we must dismiss the case.
And that's as to administrative remedies.
With respect to the notice of claim, that matter
is set forth in Hall
Corrections,

v.

Utah versus

— State

Department

of

which is also cited to you in the briefs. And

it states that — by filing a notice of claim in that case,
it was, at the same time as the case was filed not after the
case was filed.
Hall deprived the State of the opportunity to
assess his allegations and to decide, as required
by statute, whether to prove or deny the claims.
And, thus, it dismissed the case.
In this case, the notice was filed even after the
case was actually filed.

So it's clear, under the Utah
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Governmental Immunity Act that it — that this Court lacks
jurisdiction unless the notice is filed prior.
THE COURT:

And, thus, affording Salt Lake City

the opportunity to respond to it.
MS. FURSE:

Exactly, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Anything else?

MS. FURSE:

That's all.

THE COURT:

Very well.

MS. FURSE:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Appreciate the argument.

and to the point.

Thank you.

Very concise

I'll take it under advisement and then

get something out to you soon.

Thank you both.

MR. RAMEY:

Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. FURSE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

(Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the
hearing was concluded.)
-000O000-
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CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff taxpayer sought review of a decision of the District Court (Utah), which dismissed her complaint against defendants, educational employees, county employees, and state employees,
which sought a judgment concerning certain
aspects of the state educational system and
school districts and concerning the taxing practices of the county and the state.
OVERVIEW: The taxpayer brought a multiparty and multi-faceted action, and in one division complaint, she sought judgment concerning certain aspects of the educational system of
the state and five of its school districts and concerning the taxing practices of the county and
the state. The district court dismissed the complain i as to all parties. On appeal, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part and held that
the taxpayer's action alleging that local school
districts were prohibited from hiring state legislators during the term of their office was prop-

erly dismissed because absent some claim of
specific injury that was casually related to the
alleged illegal activity, the taxpayer did not
meet the standing test of having a personal
stake in the controversy. On the other hand, the
taxpayer clearly had standing to demand a refund of her 1980 property tax based on the
claim that the tax statute was unconstitutional
because the constitutionality of a tax statute
could be raised in an action properly filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-1 in the district court.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed in part and
reversed and remanded in part the decision of
the district court, which dismissed the taxpayer's action concerning certain aspects of the
educational system of the state and five of its
school districts and concerning the taxing practices of the county and the state.
CORE TERMS: property taxes, governmental
immunity, school districts, textbook, protest,
teacher, resident, declaratory judgment, expenditure, exempt, public interest, personal stake,
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equitable, notice, school systems, cause of action, adverse impact, religious, adversely, taxation, educators, societal, entity, common law,
governmental actions, failed to comply,
branches of government, private property, educator-legislators, educational
LcxisNexis(R) Headnotes

Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing >
General Overview
Ci^il Procedure > Declaratory Judgment Actions > State Judgments > General Overview
Civil Procedure > Remedies > Injunctions >
General Overview
[H M1 ] Injunctive relief is a traditional equitable
remedy in the appropriate cases, but as with
other common law remedies, the moving party
must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of
the c tirt. The same jurisdictional standard applies io declaratory judgments. The statutory
creation of relief in the form of a declaratory
judgment does not create a cause of action or
gram jurisdiction to the court where it would
no i ciherwise exist. The Utah Declaratory
Judgment Statute merely authorizes a new form
of relief, which in some cases provides a fuller
and rore adequate remedy than that which exis!..; ; ier the common law.

CV-v.' Procedure > Declaratory Judgment Acti( 'is > Federal Judgments > General Overview
dfts -Uttional Law > The Judiciary > Case or
Con!*rversy > Ripeness
[1 !N Four requirements must be satisfied befo e e district court can proceed in an action
fo declaratory judgment: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the
pa. lie must be adverse; (3) the parties seeking
re \-'\ must have a legally protectible interest in
the controversy; and (4) the issues between the
pa; li must be ripe for judicial determination.

Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing >
Personal Stake
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > General Overview
[HN3] For standing, plaintiff must be able to
show that he suffers some distinct and palpable
injury that gives him a personal stake in the
outcome of the legal dispute. It is generally insufficient for a plaintiff to assert only a general
interest he shares in common with members of
the public at large. The court cannot entertain
generalized grievances that are more appropriately directed to the legislative and executive
branches of the state government.

Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing >
Personal Stake
Constitutional Law > The Judiciary > Case or
Controversy > Standing > Elements
[HN4] The judicial power of the state of Utah
is not constitutionally restricted by the language of U.S. Const, art. Ill requiring "cases"
and "controversies," since no similar requirement exists in the Utah Constitution. The court
may grant standing where matters of great public interest and societal impact are concerned.
However, the requirement that the plaintiff
have a personal stake in the outcome of a legal
dispute is rooted in the historical and constitutional role of the judiciary in Utah.

Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing >
General Overview
[HN5] The requirement that a plaintiff have a
personal stake in the outcome of a dispute is
intended to confine the courts to a role consistent with the separation of powers, and to limit
the jurisdiction of the courts to those disputes
which are most efficiently and effectively resolved through the judicial process. The courts
are most competent in the exercise of their
function when they have a concrete factual con-
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text conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences of judicial action.

Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing >
Gene: ill Overview
[HN( I A plaintiff with a direct and personal
strke in the outcome of a dispute aids the court
in its deliberations by fully developing all the
m iji i! factual and legal issues in an effort to
cc r iiue the court that the relief requested redresses the claimed injury.

ConsfPutional Law > The Judiciary > General
0 ••«./;•

ien>

[li
• Constitutionally, the courts have the
du !• biigation to apply statutory and common
la-.' -inciples to a particular dispute and to
ev;i!uaie those principles against governing
couMiluuonal standards.

C/V/' Procedure > Justiciability > Standing >
J i rial Stake
[\ ...'\X; Although the court has power to grant
si; : r u where matters of great public interest
a: i cietal impact are concerned, the court
does not readily relieve a plaintiff of the saluto; y rev; u irement of showing a real and personal
interest in the dispute.
C:"'" rocedure > Justiciability > Standing >
1 v : a I Stake
[i ' The court engages in a three-step inq\ r J reviewing the question of a plaintiffs
st: v;': e to sue. The first step in the inquiry is
di;e< le,! io the traditional criteria of the plaintil .V personal stake in the controversy. One
w1 o ' adversely affected by governmental acti< es is standing under this criterion. One who
is • diversely affected has no standing. A
n*. : legation of an adverse impact is not suffi a There must also be some causal relate u i e alleged between the injury to the plain-

tiff, the governmental actions and the relief requested. Because standing questions are usually
raised prior to the introduction of any evidence,
the court is necessarily required to make a
judgment whether proof of such a causal relationship is difficult or impossible and whether
the relief requested is substantially likely to redress the injury claimed. If the plaintiff satisfies
this requirement, he is granted standing and no
further inquiry is required.

Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing >
General Overview
[HN10] If the plaintiff does not have standing
under the first step in the three-step inquiry of
standing, the court addresses the question of
whether there is anyone who has a greater interest in the outcome of the case than the plaintiff. If there is no one, and if the issue is
unlikely to be raised at all if the plaintiff is denied standing, this court grants standing. When
standing is predicated on the assertion that the
issues involve great public interest and societal
impact, the court retains our practical concern
that the parties involved have the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual
questions. The court denies standing when a
plaintiff does not satisfy the first requirement of
the analysis and there are potential plaintiffs
with a more direct interest in the issues who
can more adequately litigate the issues.

Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing >
General Overview
[HN11] The third step in the three-step analysis
of standing is to decide if the issues raised by
the plaintiff are of sufficient public importance
in and of themselves to grant him standing. The
absence of a more appropriate plaintiff does not
automatically justify granting standing to a particular plaintiff. This court must still determine,
on a case-by-case basis, that the issues are of
sufficient weight and that they are not more
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propc'v addressed by the other branches of
gever --icnt.

of an action in the appropriate district court is
deemed as being in compliance with § 59-1111.

Chi! procedure > Justiciability > General
Overv;''\v

Crunh-al Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Miscellaneous Offenses > General
0^r.'.:w

E ':tc\ ::)ti Law > Departments of Education >
Si te , a rtments of Education > Authority
[I-iNfi: ; Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-10 provides
thnt m mbers of boards of education are guilty
of a : sdemeanor if those persons refuse or
nc ' i lo enforce the use of textbooks adopted
by v
tah State Textbook commission.

E 'an /'•>// Law > Departments of Education >
Si 'te
Hirtments of Education > Authority
Ei in'.- on. Law > Instruction > General Overvi r

[I
us
be
ar

\ '• Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-2 states that
• ; ie textbooks adopted by the state text>!•* in mission is mandatory in all districts
1 ; h schools of the state.

G vc
cuts > Courts > Court Personnel
G
ncnts > Local Governments > Lice ,; V
7Vv .M' > State & Local Taxes > General
a

•••

[i <
th i
si! h
th «v
re :;
Sh :;
cl
ar :
ta ; •
ic '
N |
tli ;•
6\ s

•

v.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-11 provides
n a party deems a levy to be unlawful,
: ly may pay under protest such tax and
•} the party so paying or his legal repc may bring an action in the tax divi;c appropriate district court against the
o whom said tax or license was paid, or
he state, county, municipality or other
;lit on whose behalf the same was colo recover said tax paid under protest.
jular form of protest is required and in
nee of the creation of a tax court in the
,:i which the action is filed, the bringing

Tax Law > State & Local Taxes
[HN15] The constitutionality or legality of a
tax statute may be raised in an action that is
properly filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
59-11-1 in the district court.

Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > General
Overview
[HN16] The court extends the taxpayers right
to sue concerning illegal use of public monies
to include an action against the state.

Civil Procedure > Equity > General Overview
[HN17] Taxpayers may resort to a court of equity to prevent the misapplication of public
funds, and the right is based upon the taxpayers' equitable ownership of such funds and their
liability to replenish the public treasury for the
deficiency which is be caused by the misappropriation.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Miscellaneous Offenses > Abuse of
Public Office > Neglect of Office > Elements
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Claims By & Against
[HN18] See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11.

Torts > Public Entity Liability > Immunity >
General Overview
[HN19] The word "injury" is defined in Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-2(6) as death, injury to a
person, damage to or loss of property, or any
other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent. The
definition of "injury" underscores the real con-
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cern cr'-\e governmental immunity act, namely
that ; vernmental entity, like individuals and
priva* * ntities, should be liable for an injury
inflir : by it.

Govcrr
istra:'\
Gove
men
Tax
Pmr

tents > Local Governments > AdminBoards
merits > State & Territorial GovernClaims By & Against
> State & Local Taxes > Personal
Tax > Exempt Property > General

[HN:

See Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-2.
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17] Plaintiff/appellant, Lynn A. Jenkins
-nkins), has filed this multi-party and
run -' eted lawsuit which defies a simple and
cor
explanation. In a one division complin:
ected to all defendants, Jenkins seeks
a ;•!=• nt concerning certain aspects of the
edi:
ial system of the state of Utah and five

of its school districts, and concerning the taxing
practices of Salt Lake County and the state of
Utah. Apparently none of the defendants [**2]
considered it necessary to exercise their rights
under Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure to require a more definite statement
in light of what is arguably an ambiguous complaint. All the defendants, rather, proceeded
under Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to ask that the entire complaint be
dismissed for, inter alia, a lack of jurisdiction
because Jenkins lacked standing to press these
claims, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, failure to comply with the
Utah governmental immunity statute, U.C.A.,
1953, § 63-30-1 to -38 (1978 and Supp. 1981
and Interim Supp. 1983), and the previous adjudication of the issues in similar suits filed by
Jenkins. l In response to these motions, the district court dismissed Jenkins1 complaint "as to
all of the defendants" because: (1) Jenkins
lacked standing, (2) Jenkins failed to comply
with notice and undertaking requirements of
the governmental immunity act, and (3) the
matter was res judicata as "most issues" have
already been decided by the Utah Supreme
Court. On appeal, Jenkins asks that the district
court's order of dismissal be reversed.
1 Jenkins v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d
289 (1980); Jenkins v. State, Utah, 585
P.2d 442 (1978).
[**3] The first set of defendants which can
be identified in Jenkins' complaint are those
related to the Utah educational system. These
individual defendants can be matched with
their respective school systems as follows: defendant Swan is a teacher for the Tooele School
District; defendants Curan and Burningham are
teachers for the Davis School District; defendant Bishop is a teacher and defendant Alfor is
a principal for the Ogden School District; and
defendant LeFevere is Director of Personnel for
the Weber School District. The Jordan School
District, the State of Utah, Superintendent of
Public Instruction Walter D. Talbot, and the
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Hducational Association are also defenrenkins' complaint prays for judgment
ows:
!. A declaration that the local
S liool Districts and the Utah DeI ; tment of Public Instruction are
;,:;• ^hibited from hiring Utah legislators during the term of their of;lce or continuing such legislators
•o employees once they become
members of legislature. Article V,
Section 1 and Article VI, § 6 of the
Ijah State Constitution, state, res; xtively, (a) "no person charged
\ :h the exercise of the powers
pioperly belonging to one of these
departments [**4] [of the Utah
government], shall exercise any
i actions appertaining to either of
;lv; others," and (b) that "no person
h Iding any public office of profit
o: trust under authority . . . . of this
• ite, shall be a member of the legis iture."
2. A declaration that the educate -legislators named as individual
a endants are in violation of Utah
C de Ann. § 67-16 (1953) for failir i to file a conflict of interest disci sure statement concerning monie allegedly received from the
l ih Education Association during
ts ; time when the legislature is in
session.
3. A permanent restraining order prohibiting the Utah Educate rial Association from paying,
lr ing, loaning or gifting educate s-legislators during the term of
t' ir office as legislators.
[*1148] 4. A declaration that
t!-- "Utah State Textbook Commissi n" and the mandatory use of
tc tbook provisions of Utah law, §

53-13-2 and 53-13-10, U.C.A.,
1953, is unconstitutional, since it is
in violation of Article X, § 9 of the
Utah State Constitution, which
states: "Neither the Legislature nor
the State Board of Education shall
have power to prescribe textbooks
to be used in the common
schools."

The second category [**5] of issues addressed in Jenkins1 complaint relates to taxation
and certain expenditures of public funds. It appears that Jenkins' demand for relief is directed
to the Salt Lake County Attorney, the Salt Lake
County Commission, the Salt Lake County
Treasurer, the State of Utah, the Utah Attorney
General and the Utah Tax Commission. Jenkins filed a protest with his 1980 property
taxes, which were paid in the amount of
$807.89. He prays for the following relief:
1. A refund of his 1980 property
tax.
2. An order to Salt Lake
County to prepare, publish and update a list of all exempt taxable
property, itemized by owner valuation and amount of tax forgiven;
3. A declaratory judgment that
the funding of the Uniform State
Public Education System by local
property tax is unconstitutional as
not providing for equal distribution
of tax throughout the state and being a denial of equal protection.
4. A declaratory judgment that
providing public property and public services to religious organizations which are exempt from the
payment of property tax is in violation of Article 1, § 4 of the Ut^h
State Constitution, which states:
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"1he State shall make no law respecting an [**6] establishment of
rciigion" and "no public money or
property shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction or for
the support of any ecclesiastical establishment."

I.
We consider first the question of whether
Jenkins had standing to raise those issues concerning :he service in the Utah Legislature of
Utah educators. The threshold requirement that
Jenkins have standing is equally applicable
whether he seeks declaratory or injunctive relief | H Ml] Injunctive relief is a traditional equitable remedy in the appropriate cases, but as
with other common law remedies, the moving
party m-st have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of ihe court. The same jurisdictional standard applies to declaratory judgments. The
statutory creation of relief in the form of a declaia orv judgment does not create a cause of
actio;! o grant jurisdiction to the court where it
would rot otherwise exist. The Utah Declaratory J tie ;ment Statute merely authorizes a new
form of relief, which in some cases will provide
a fui'er and more adequate remedy than that
whieii e: :isted under the common law. Gray v.
Dcju. If 3 Utah 339, 135 P.2d251 (1943).
vr

e have previously held [**7J that [HN2]
four eonirements must be satisfied before the
distr t rourt can proceed in an action for declar:i M \ judgment: "(1) there must be a justiciable ii.-or roversy; (2) the interests of the parties
miisi be adverse; (3) the parties seeking relief
miisi h;ve a legally protectible interest in the
con! ovcisy; and (4) the issues between the parties nu>t be ripe for judicial determination."
Jcnk. is v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 289 (1980)
(cilir i laird v. State, Utah, 5"*-! V Id riJ

u

(1978)). See also Main Parking Mall v. Salt
Lake City Corp., Utah, 531 P.2d 866 (1975);
Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d 818
(1951). Requirements (2) and (3) represent the
traditional test for standing. [HN3] Plaintiff
must be able to show that he has suffered some
distinct and palpable injury that gives him a
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 45 L.
Ed. 2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975); Stromquist
v. Cokayne, Utah, 646 P.2d 746 (1982); Sears
v. Ogden City, Utah, 572 P.2d 1359 (1977);
Main Parking Mall. It is generally insufficient
for a [*1149] plaintiff to assert only a general
interest he shares in common with members of
the [**8] public at large. See Stromquist;
Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713 (1978). We
will not entertain generalized grievances that
are more appropriately directed to the legislative and executive branches of the state government.
Unlike the federal system, [HN4] the judicial power of the state of Utah is not constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III
of the United States Constitution requiring
"cases" and "controversies," since no similar
requirement exists in the Utah Constitution.
We previously have held that "this Court may
grant standing where matters of great public
interest and societal impact are concerned."
Jenkins v. State, Utah, 585 P.2d 442, 443
(1978) (footnote omitted). However, the requirement that the plaintiff have a personal
stake in the outcome of a legal dispute is rooted
iii the historical and constitutional role of the
judiciary in I Jtali.
Historically, the courts were an extension of
the executive branch and were developed to
resolve disputes between private parties, and
between the government as a land owner and
private parties concerning the use and ownership of land. With the advent of mercantilism,
industrialization and urbanization, the courts
[**9] became increasingly concerned with disputes over the regulation of economic activity
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by private contract, and injuries to individuals
in their daily activities in a crowded and complex society. "The liability of one individual to
another under the law . . . . is a matter of private rights
Private-rights disputes . . . . lie
at the core of the historically recognized judicial power." Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
102 S. Ct. 2858, 2870-71, 73 L. Ed. 2d 598
(19-') (citations omitted). The courts developed ways of identifying and categorizing partial!: r grievances, techniques for the receipt of
in Toi Kiiion, and principles for arriving at a
resolution of these disputes. See generally T.
Piuci neit, A Concise History of the Common
Law 5th ed. 1956). In the course of this development, the judiciary emerged as a government 1 institution distinct from the executive.
The ic:itification of the judiciary as one of
three separate and equal branches of governrr.cn' \\\ our written state Constitution must be
view j !a light of this historical development.
i lie rent in the tripartite allocation of governm nfil powers is the historical [**10] and
prnp *-n!;c conviction that particular disputes
are i ost amenable to resolution in particular
ft p.:- •;. [HN5] The requirement that a plaintiff
h \ i personal stake in the outcome of a dispute ; intended to confine the courts to a role
c< "I:it with the separation of powers, and to
lir.i:' • jurisdiction of the courts to those dispute: which are most efficiently and effectively
reso ee through the judicial process. See Flast
v. G '•,</, 392 U.S. 83, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947, 88 S.
C . 1 VI (1968). The courts are most competent
ij \\: exercise of their function when they have
a "e, ;.ete factual context conducive to a realh ic ppreciation of the consequences of judici • •., >n." Valley Forge Christian College v.
A;-n reus United for Separation of Church
ana ;aie, 454 U.S. 464, 102 S. Ct. 752, 758,
7 ) I id. 2d 700 (1982). [HN6] A plaintiff
with : direct and personal stake in the outcome
of a :w)ute will aid the court in its deliberations
fully developing all the material facti ii ; •;,; legal issues in an effort to convince the

court that the relief requested will redress the
claimed injury.
[HN7] Constitutionally, the courts have the
dual obligation to apply statutory and common
law principles [**11] to a particular dispute
and to evaluate those principles against governing constitutional standards. The propriety of
such action by the federal courts has been recognized since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803), and this Court
has recognized that it is the inherent role of the
judiciary to interpret constitutional provisions.
See Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674 (1982);
Jenkins v. State. In the proper discharge of their
duty in this regard, the courts must necessarily
defer on some issues to the other branches of
state government, For example, the airing of
generalized grievances [*1150] and the vindication of public rights are properly addressed to
the legislature, a forum where freewheeling debate on hi-Kid issues of public policy is in order.
To grant standing iu u litigant,
who cannot distinguish himself
from all citizens, would be a significant inroad on the representative form of government, and cast
the courts in the role of supervising
the coordinate branches of government. It would convert the judiciary into an open forum for the
resolution of political and ideological disputes about the performance of government.

[**12] Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713,
717(1978),
An overstepping of appropriate restraints on
judicial review of such political and ideological
disputes is not only constitutionally and historically inappropriate, but also unwise. Although
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the 1 ''ah judiciary is not life-tenured, the follow : observation is applicable:
Repeated and essentially head-on
confrontations between the lifetenured branch and representative
branches of government will not,
ia the long run, be beneficial to either. The public confidence essen(;; I to the former and the vitality
critical to the latter may well erode
if we do not exercise self-restraint
in the utilization of our power to
n« gative the actions of the other
branches.

Uivff'ti States v. Richardson, L.; \,.>, 166,
IS;:. : L. Ed. 2d 678, 94 S. Ct. 2940 (1074)
(Pov 11. J., concurring).
T o afore, despite our recognition of this
[HN ( ourt's power to "grant standing where
matlv ; )£ great public interest and societal impact a o concerned," this Court will not readily
relic v a. plaintiff of the salutory requirement of
slio^
a real and personal interest in the disP'U:. i light of the historical, constitutional
aiu: : aical considerations [**13] discussed
abo\ . \ve [HN9] engage in a three-step inquiry
in iv .ring the question of a plaintiffs standing ;
e. The first step in the inquiry will be
dire', : :o the traditional criteria of the plaintiffs a sonal stake in the controversy. One
whu
dversely affected by governmental acti' •;:•
.; standing under this criterion. One
wo
..ot adversely affected has no standing.
A a J allegation of an adverse impact is not
suli *aa There must also be some causal rein! i; /:':) alleged between the injury to the
p!ai;
the governmental actions and the relief ; a asted. Because standing questions are
usi::
raised prior to the introduction of any
e\-k.. : we will necessarily be required to
n f
i judgment whether proof of such a
can
relationship is difficult or impossible
ana ie her the relief requested is substantially

likely to redress the injury claimed. K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 22.20 at 368-70
(1982 Supp.). If the plaintiff satisfies this requirement, he will be granted standing and no
further inquiry is required.
[HN10] If the plaintiff does not have standing under the first step, we will then address the
question of whether there is anyone who has
[**14] a greater interest in the outcome of the
case than the plaintiff. If there is no one, and if
the issue is unlikviy to be raised at all if the
plaintiff is denied standing, this Court will
grant standing. See, e.g., State v. Lewis,
Alaska, 559 P.2d 630, 635 (1977). When standing is predicated on the assertion that the issues
involve "great public interest and societal impact," we will retain our practical concern that
the parties involved have the interest necessary
to effectively assist the court in developing and
reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions. The Court will deny standing when a
plaintiff does not satisfy the first requirement of
the analysis and there are potential plaintiffs
with a more direct interest in the issues who
can more adequately litigate the issues.
[HN11] The third step in the analysis is to
decide if the issues raised by the plaintiff are of
sufficient public importance in and of themselves to grant him standing. The absence of a
more appropriate plaintiff will not automatically justify granting standing to a particular
plaintiff. This Court must still determine, on a
case-by-case basis, that the issues are of sufficient weight, see Jenkins [**15] v. Finlinson,
Utah, 607 P.2d 289 (1980), [*1151] and that
they are not more properly addressed b> the
other branches of government. Constitutional
and practical considerations will necessarily
affect our decisions in cases where a plaintiff
who lacks standing under step one nevertheless
raises important public issues. These are matters to be more fully developed in the context
of future cases.
In this case, Jenkins claims that he is bringthis complaint as a resident of the state of
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Utah and as a "citizen, taxpayer, registered
vote and parent" who is a member of a class of
pers ns with a joint or common right against
the i efendants. Jenkins is a resident of Salt
Lake County and has paid taxes to that entity.
Jenkas is not a resident of the Tooele, Davis,
Ogc! w or Weber School Districts, the districts
which employ the educators/legislators named
as c! feniants in this action. Jenkins fails to
ma'; any allegations that he is a resident of the
lei'i. stive districts from which these individuals Jre elected. His claimed personal stake in
the Lsue of educators serving as legislators is
thai he vote on legislation which financially
be: A Us them as employees of the education
[7
>] system and that this adversely affects
Jenk'ns as a taxpayer.
• pkins1 mere reliance on his general status
as ; "v-: payer and citizen does nothing to distia!••; <h him from any member of the public at
la;;; with regard to this dispute. His challenge
is e•';-<•' iely broad; he attacks the constitutional
f educators serving in the Utah legislatn;v hut makes no claim of a particularized
i r : , s / to himself by virtue of the claimed
w;r s Absent some claim of specific injury
wk * is causally related to the alleged illegal
a< :
v, Jenkins has not met the traditional
ss.
.\g test articulated in step one above.
• ,ni ;,1S ^ ^ g j . requests that we grant him
st•'• eg under the rationale that he raises questi
of great public interest and societal imp e
We need not address that issue. Since
Jc
-s' claim for standing on this issue is
1(
pre
d solely on the grounds of its public
J,.,, •':i-;Ce? we will not grant him standing
v
:he pleadings reveal other potential plaii1
ti;; . i!: i a more direct interest in this particular
qr
. Jenkins' interest as a resident of the
s*'* . : Utah is certainly less direct than the
iis
si of the residents of the school districts
v.ik 1 employ these [**17] individuals or the
lei;" -live districts from which they were
e!e< i We need not and do not decide here
v'
r residents of those areas would have
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standing to bring this complaint. We do find,
however, that Jenkins 1 interest is less direct
than the interest of those living in the relevant
school districts or legislative districts. Therefore, we will not invoke the standing doctrine
of "great public interest and societal impact" to
consider his request for standing.
We also hold that Jenkins lacks standing to
present his claims that U.C.A., 1953, §§ 53-132 and 53-13-10 are unconstitutional. [HN12]
Section 53-13-10 provides that members of
boards of education shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if those persons refuse or neglect "to
enforce the use of textbooks adopted by the
[Utah State Textbook] commission . . . ." Jenkins does not allege that he is a member of a
local board of education and therefore cannot
contend that he is or is likely to be subject to
prosecution under this code section. In the absence of any such personal adverse impact,
Jenkins lacks standing to raise the issue of the
constitutionality of the statute. See Redwood
Gym v. Salt Lake City Commission, Utah,
[**18] 624 P.2d 1138 (1981); Cavaness v.
Cox, Utah, 598 P.2d 349 (1979). [HN13] Section 53-13-2 states that use of the textbooks
adopted by the state textbook commission
"shall be mandatory in all districts and high
schools of the state." Jenkins fails to allege that
this mandate adversely affects him or his children, except insofar as it may inflict some kind
of "spiritual" discomfort caused by the existence of a statute he believes is unconstitutional. This Court may not issue an advisory
opinion on :h\>. q.is-stion merely to relieve his
discomfort. See Redwood Gym and Baird. Further, members of local boards of education
constitute a class of potential plaintiffs with a
more direct interest in this question [*1152]
than Jenkins, and, therefore, we will not address the question of whether Jenkins should be
granted standing because of the alleged public
importance of the issues involved.
Jenkins also requests that this Court enter
an order directing the "educator-legislators" to
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file n conflict of interest disclosure statement
cone r u n g money allegedly received from the
Uta! - fit:ucation Association. U.C.A., 1953, §
67-1 -12 declares it a misdemeanor for a "pub •
lie i Ti'.-er or public [**19] employee [to]
knev n d y and intentionally" violate the statute, he statute does not provide Jenkins with
stnn' 'ng to act as a private attorney general in
the ( lb: cement of this statute. This Court will
net
ume to order these defendants to do
thus
oh they are already required to do by
sun . '. fin fact the statute even applies to legi s t s.
- ris further requests this Court to perrons s :';/ restrain the Utah Education Association '-oni providing gifts, loans and other fin:Mv;
support to "educator-legislators."
U.C .. 1953, § 67-16-10 states that "no person
S; ;•
uce or seek to induce any public office T
: ublic employee to violate any of the
p o r us of this act." T h e appropriate parties
to i' • 'e any action concerning violations of
this
ite are in the executive and legislative
brri ..-;. Jenkins' position in this situation is
icl
•;.' to that of the citizenry at large, and
tl c: -re he lacks standing to pursue this cause
o . *-\.
I].
: e introductory portion of this opinioii.
v*
led the relief sought by Jenkins in conre
with payment of his 1980 properly
t: :
Apparently these claims, as well as
tl-o
scussed above, were dismissed [**20]
b • iistrict court on the basis that Jenkins
h k< landing, that he failed to comply with
t1 •: ; edural requirements of the statutes on
g \ J: cental immunity, and that the doctrine
of i
dicata applied. Unlike the issues cort:
ex::
educators in the legislature, none of the
o »•;<
s concerning taxation and expenditures
r:MS'.- ' y Jenkins appear to have been previo i.
'dressed to the district court or to this
C•»•:
Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata
d cs:
apply. Thus, w e must review the dis-

+

*

trict court's dismissal o n the issues of standing
and the applicability of the Governmental Immunity Act.
i\

Jenkins alleges that he paid $807.89 for
property taxes in 1980. A copy of a Salt Lake
County tax assessment form in that amount is
appended to his petition along with a letter addressed to the Salt Lake County Treasurer.
This letter advised that Jenkins' taxes had been
paid by Prudential Federal Savings & Loan and
that the payment of the tax was under protest.
The letter is dated November 29, 1980, the date
noted on the tax assessment forms as the deadline for payment of the 1980 property taxes.
[HN14] U.C.A., 1953, § 59-11-11 (Supp. 1981)
provides that when a party deems [**21] a
levy to be unlawful, "such party may pay under
protest such tax
. and thereupon the party so
paying or his legal representative may bring an
action in the tax division of the appropriate district court against the officer to w h o m said tax
or license was paid, or against the state, county,
municipality or other taxing unit o n whose b e half the same was collected, to recover said tax
. . . . paid under protest." N o particular form of
protest is required, Murdoch v. Murdoch, 38
Utah 373, 113 P. 330 (1911), and in the ab^
sence of the creation of a tax court in the district in which the action is filed, the bringing of
an action in the appropriate district court is
deemed as being in compliance with § 59-1111. See U.C.A., 1953, §§ 59-24-1 to -9 (Supp.
1981 and Interim Supp. 1983). For purposes o f
our review, w e assume Jenkins' allegations that
he paid his 1980 property taxes and filed the
letter of protest appended to his petition are
true.
[HN15] T h e constitutionality or legality o f
a tax statute m a y be raised in an action that is
properly filed pursuant to § 59-11-1 in the district court. See State Tax Commission
[*1153]
v. Wright, I Jtah, 596 P.2d 634 (1979). Therefore, [**22] Jenkins clearly has standing to
demand a refund of his 1980 property tax based
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on 1 :s claim that the tax statute pursuant to
whi i all or part of that tax was assessed is unco: tu'ional. Jenkins1 specific claim is that
the : -stem of uniform funding of state public
eriiu: ion by local property taxes is unconstitution; . We hold that Jenkins has standing to
denv id a refund of all or part of his 1980
pro; !y taxes based on his allegation of the
unc s: i tutionality of this statutory scheme.
nl ins also requests this Court to declare
the : nviding of public property and public serv •:-.: !o religious organizations, which are exe? • by law from the payment of property
t a : • : - • • unconstitutional under Art. 1, Sec. 4 of
the (; h Constitution. This Court has long
hHr i: t a taxpayer has standing to prosecute
an :• iui against municipalities and other poll::
subdivisions of the state for illegal expa
u res. In an early case involving expenditi : I) the construction of a water distribution
sy>\ i5 we said:
To the extent that the water rates
are excessive his taxes are increased, and the mere fact that it
;; creases in like proportion the
!; xes of all other taxpayers does
n- t [**23] deprive him of the right
< maintain an action to arrest the
waste of public funds.
Ihir !ailt v. Ogden Waterworks Co., J J U L .
2>T .-,5-96, 93 P. 828, 831 (1908). See also
Tnc- ' lluilding Association v. Tooele High
Set;. ' District, 43 TTml> 362, 134 P 894
(19: »
%

paypi:: i
si•><•';
P ' '
g •! i •
p :
s 1 •-*

have also [HN16] extended the tax; right to sue concerning illegal use of
monies to include an action against the
h Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228
S (1951), we reviewed the various ar
(
I for and against the grant of such a tax!; aht of action and concluded that it
'be permitted in this state. M[A] taxpayer

should be permitted to enjoin the unlawful expenditure of tax moneys in which he has a pecuniary interest, or to prevent increased levies
for illegal purposes." Id at 441, 228 P.2d at
821. In arriving at this conclusion, we quoted
with approval the following language of the
Illinois Supreme Court:
^y e j i a v e r e p e a t e diy held that
[HN17] taxpayers may resort to a
court of equity to prevent the misapplication of public funds, and
that this right is based upon the
taxpayers' equitable ownership of
such funds and their liability to replenish the public treasury [**24]
for the deficiency which would be
caused by the misappropriation.

Id at 443, 228 P.2d at 823 (quoting Fergus v.
Russel, 270 111. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915))
In applying the foregoing authorities to this
case, we note that Jenkins makes allegations
concerning the limited amount of private property in the state of IItali subject to state taxation. He further alleges that because of the limited amount of property available for taxation
and the unconstitutional expenditure of tax dollars on religious institutions which have large
property holdings but pay no property tax, he
must pay increased taxes as an owner of taxable private property. He has alleged that he is
directly and adversely affected by this governmental action. We hold that these allegations
give him standing under the test set out in Section I of this opinion. In arriving at this conclusion, we need not determine the extent of the
adverse impact on Jenkins; we only conclude
that he has alleged a direct adverse impact
which may be subject to proof, and it is likely
that if the governmental action is declared unconstitutional, the adverse impact on Jenkins
will be relieved. We hold, therefore, that Jenkins [**25] has standing to raise his claim
concerning the unconstitutional expenditure of
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public monies on tax exempt private property
held "w religious organizations as part of his
chir i:!ed under IJ.C.A., 1953, § 59-11-11
(Sup •. 1981).
P.
The motions of the defendants to dismiss
Jenkms' entire complaint were granted on the
basis d:at he failed to comply with the l-iali
C >v -r. mental Immunity Act. .v.- I • (\A .
1' :. ;" 63-30-1 to -38 (1978 & [*1154] Supp.
T m ,'v Interim Supp. 1983). We need only
ad d s 11 lis issue in connection with Jenkins'
clam for the return of his property tax under §
59-1 -1 1 as those are the only causes of action
conct nmg which we have found Jenkins to
haw a siding.
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P.2d 1230, 1234 (1980). See also Thomas v.
Clearfield City, Utah, 642 P.2d 737 (1982).
Jenkins' claim for an adjustment on his property taxes is neither an "injury" as defined in §
63-30-2(6) nor is it an "action under this act."
Jenkins is prosecuting this action under a separate statutory authorization, § 59-11-11, which
predates the enactment of the Governmental
Immunity Act and which provides a distinct
and separate basis for his claim against the
government. The cause of action authorized
under § 59-11-11 has its own notice provision
in the form of the requirement to pay the tax
under protest and has its own statute of limitation. Seel J.C.A., [**27] 1953, § 78-12-31. It
is not governed by the notice or undertaking
requirements in the Governmental Immunity

x

district court found that Jenkins had
f,:i • in comply with the notice and undertakh i mements of the Governmental Immii
ir ;• .'• ;. Section 63-30-11 of that Act now
p: cvi ;s that:
JTTN18] Any person having a
c'aim for injury against a govern:rental entity or against an employee shall before maintaining an
Mon for an act or omission oca ring during the performance of
m. duties, within the scope of ems'oyment, or under color of authority, shall file a written notice of
c a i i n with such [**26] entity.

[I!N"d The word "injury" is defined in § 63.3("-2v i as "death, injury to a person, damage to
or lo: oi" property, or any other injury that a
pc;s( may suffer to his person, or estate, dwmi! )e actionable if inflicted by a private
perse oi his agent." This definition of "injury"
undo- -ores the real concern of the governmen
tal in aunity act, namely that "a governmental
en! i -.' I I .\ e individuals and private entities,
si >u be liable for an injury inflicted by it."
S. nu n\i v. Salt Lake City Corp., Utah, 605

Jenkins seeks equitable relief in the form of
i declaratory judgment, in addition to a return
t ; die property tax paid under protest. In El
Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp,f
Utah, 565 P.2d 778, 779 (1977), we said that
the "common law exception to governmental
immunity pertaining to equitable claims has
long been recognized in this jurisdiction." We
held that neither the passage of time nor the
enactment of the Governmental Immunity Act
has eroded that principle. Id. at 780. In 1978,
the statutory section authorizing the suit in El
Rancho, see U.C.A., 1953, § 10-7-77, was repealed and such claims are now covered exclusively by the Governmental Immunity Act. See
Laws of Utah, 1978 ch. 27 § 12. These
amendments do not undermine the continued
viability of our holding in El Rancho that equitable claims of this nature for assessments
made "without authority of law," are exempt
from the notice requirements. El Rancho, at
780, Because this holding is predicated on the
common law exception to governmental immuiiity for equitable claims, [**28] such claims
are also exempt from the undertaking requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act.
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V'e also note that Jenkins has requested this
Coin :o order the Salt Lake County Tax Commissi n to create and maintain certain records
concr-ning private property which is exempt
from nation. [HN20] U.C.A. 1953, § 59-11-2
provi <\s ihat "if on examination it is found that
any c ' i c e r . . . . has neglected or refused to perform ay duty relating to revenue, the attorney
gcner 1 must prosecute the delinquent." Jenkins
hns : ;!ed to allege any statute or rule which
ir. : po s upon the tax commission a duty to
m •;: :n the records in the manner he requests.
E• v:". tli:re were such a duty, it is the response il; o! the attorney general to prosecute off cr. Si ) have neglected to maintain records.
Jr:-s-:; s may of course seek any information
w.ud is relevant to his property tax claims
th:\-u \ normal discovery procedures. Any
d ;pi s concerning the availability and relev iij; )f niis information or the inconvenience
o
uc'iig it in a specific [*1155] fonn
w HI! * e appropriately addressed to the district
c< i:; .; usuant to its power to control discover.'.
II
.A we noted at the outset, the [**29] coin
p'v
11 is case is complicated and confusing.
P
•!" 1 is not clearly identified the specific
p '"'
o vhom his allegations are directed. ?!
is
!;:iate that the defendants did noi ivq
clarification of the complaint prior \o
p - Mi::; with the motion to dismiss. We
h ••:: :empted to organize the issues presented
o: ;' :al in order to address them. The district
c< u
)i cr of dismissal is reversed insofar as
ii
isscd the causes of action discussed in
p
f his opinion, and affirmed in all other
r •; c Lb. This case is remanded to the district
c w f : further proceedings consistent wilii
tl

• ( -: U :-ll.

v
ti v.
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CONCUR: Gordon R. Hall, Chief JusHi \ H. Oaks, Justice.
•/! BY: WAHLQUIST

D I S S E N T BY: WAHLQUIST
DISSENT
WAHLQUIS I , District Judge: (Concurring
and Dissenting.)
I dissent in part. I concur in the majority
opinion except in the particular referred to below.
I have read the plaintiff/appellant's pleading
and brief and have heard his argument. The
plaintiff is not a member of the bar. He appears
pro se. He evidences considerable academic
training and intellectual control, but does not
perform in accordance with the customs of the
bar. He should [**30] not be rewarded with
undue tolerance at the expense of the defendants for appearing pro se, nor should his
communications be rejected because they are
not ordinary in the court setting. What he is
alleging in layman's terms is surprising, shocking and seems unbelievable; yet, he makes his
allegations in sober seriousness.
His allegations, as I understand he intends
them, are: there is an operating, grand conspiracy executed by a large segment of the executive branch of the government (involved in
public education) to gain control over certain
important functions of the legislative branch.
He has filed one complaint that in pseudolegalistic words embraces the breadth of his
allegations When studied in the context of independent paragraphs, it appears to be the allegations of totally independent and unrelated
complaints, but taken as he seems to intend it, it
is a related allegation. He alleges that the vast
majority of the state public school teachers and
many of the administrators are members of a
group (Utah Education Association) (hereafter
"UEA"). They are alleged to be united in the
promotion of their own interests and in the
shaping of the school system in accordance
with [**31J their desires. The UEA allegedly
secures funds from the group that it uses to fi-

Page 15
<>'/:•> l \ A l I M \

", \K*h \ Utah L h \ l S LItM, **

nance the election of favorable legislative candidal--s, more particularly, teachers and administrates. During the legislative term, the UEA
allegedly compensates the group for legislative
and personal expenses, even lost wages, if any.
He claims that the UEA makes it possible for
the teacher/legislator to draw UEA benefits,
teach ars1 salaries, and legislators1 compensation, together with earned retirement benefits
una:- bo:a the teachers' retirement program and
the ! :::•:!•: tors1 retirement program simultaneous!; iaathermore, all these duplicate wages
and i one!"its continue, not only during the legish ;\ c te: a, but throughout the year, because of
cunniiice and legislative hearings. He also
ahc;,! s ihat their power in the legislature far
exi.\A !s their number, because they are a highly
o:; •' ^ ! . unregistered, unrestricted lobby
g > * w a the power to trade votes. They have
aco.\ J he floor of the legislature, assured of
a c ; i > all information in committee meetings
ant: «• vei; i n caucuses. The plaintiff alleges that
t! is es :s in innumerable laws not possible
b «' f r ihis conspiracy. He alleges [**32] in a
tl .: :K S.s system is now primarily supported
b a ,,.s provided by the state legislature, as
o
J, fo the general intent that they be loc
( irolled by school boards. He alleges
thai
taxing system for the support of the
s< -i 1 ;stem results in favored treatment for
c v a ; a as, e.g., that a property owner of a
h. T- lo a ted in Emery County [*1156] would
p y i! me-twentieth of the taxes that a resi
d a i >alt Lake County would pay for equal
o -a !' a in a home. He further alleges that
tl
§ iture has created a textbook commiss \
empowered the state school superin
h :• I A :o regulate not only public schools but
a
' ri ate schools, so that the textbooks and
c T! nl ii are controlled throughout the state
ii v -cc. conflict with the state constitutional
P • • . V that state that the legislature will not
c-..>:. o chool books. He apparently is also
c va
! that the UEA has formed an alliance
v
a ch groups through parent groups, res•'.a; a legislation and the administration of

laws to make property tax-exempt on the basis
that it is worship property or charitable property when, in fact, it may be used to promote
the evangelistic endeavors [**33] of the
church groups, their mutual welfare funds and
their general activities involving church schools
and recreation. He alleges that it is impossible
for a taxpayer to even discover which properties are being treated as tax-exempt. He alleges
that there is no adequate remedy in the system
because it is extremely unlikely that any member of the UEA would bring a suit over a dispute concerning legislative wages or benefits
and even more unlikely that any school board
or school system would do so. He further alleges that so long as one cannot see these taxexempt properties or discover how they are
treated, a general law suit involving them is not
likely to reach the courts. He seems to be in
agreement with the late Martin. Luther King,
who attempted to bring about social change or
constitutional rulings by forcing controversies
into court. ! As a father of school children and a
taxpayer in Salt Lake County, he presses for a
judicial determination by paying his taxes under protest.
1 See Jenkins v.. State, uian, ^8D Jt\zd
442 (1978); Jenkins v. Bishop, Utah, 589
P.2d 770 (1980); Jenkins v Finlinson,
*J(ah. 607 P.2d 289 (1980).
[**34] While the plaintiff seems to welcome judicial action on any portion of these
allegations, it would be illogical not to look at
his general overall allegation for whatever
merit it might have. It is noted that the same
general melody of his complaint can be heard
periodically in the news media in connection
with legislative and school board elections. In
view of obvious public interest in the matter, I
would not dismiss it as a grandiose, paranoic
delusion. 2 I would return the case to the trial
court with directions to hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine to what extent his allegations may be supported by credible evidence; to
hear what public concerns are present that
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won! ' Plicate jurisdiction should not be entertain, c : id to direct the trial judge to make a
di:;*,*!•• li ary finding as to whether this plaintiff
is e:v li: ! to have the courts entertain jurisdiction on :he basis that he alleges an important
pt!;-!'c constitutional issue that is not likely to
rcu!; i IK; courts by any other means and should
be (!; ;m ined if the separation of powers are to
be ; T !y maintained. Such a determination
\v<h; ' vc to be made after paying due respect
t< i.. c stitutional provisions [**35] that the
ICJ.IS. ; : will be the judge of its own election
c ; . YY sies and that broad matters of a politic; uur ,; are best determined in the legislative
b h i o; government.

2
It is evident the plaintiff/appellant
has taken instruction from both Jenkins v.
State, supra, and Jenkins v. Bishop, supra. He now aims directly at the issues,
wants an evidentiary hearing and tact
fully reminds the court that in the past,
individual justices have agreed and others implied that the issue is one of importance.
Stewart, Justice, dissents.
Howe, Justice, does>.\>• ;\utiun.-'e herein;
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